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LEO P ALMTAG, Respondent, V. CARL E. DANIELSON, 
Appellant. 
" PI Broken-Oom.peDB&tion-Sale by Employer-To Broter'. Ou-
: tomer OIl Other Terms. - Ordinarily, the price at which a 
broker is authorized to sell property is considered merely an' 
asking price to guide the broker in his negotiations with 
prospective purchasers, and if he procures a purchaser willing 
to pay a lower price. the owner cannot deprive the broker 
of his commission by conducting the final negotiations himself 
and selling at a lower figure to the purchaser procured by the 
broker. 
Id.--Oompensation-Sale by Employer-To Broker. Ouatomer 
· on Other Terms.-An owner is entitled to make a special con-
· tract with a broker whereby the latter is required to procure 
'. purchaser willing to pay a particular price or meet apeei1le 
conditions imposed by the owner; and where, in such eases, 
· the owner sells the property to a purchaser procured by the 
.. broker, but on terms different from those stated in the con-
"tract, the broker is not entitled to a commiaaion in the ab.· 
, sence of bad faith. 
lei. - Compensation-Bate and Amount-Commiaafons in Ex-
cess of Fixed Price. - In brokers' net contracts, a fixed net 
amount must be paid to the owner and the broker's commission 
is limited to the excess of the payment by the purchaser over 
the net amount specified. 
lel.- .oompensation--Oonstruction of Oontract.-ln an action 
to recover a broker's commission on a written contract pro-
viding a sale price of $40,000 and a commission of 5 per cent 
or a net of $38,000 to the owner, the trial court's interpretation 
of the contract as a general contract merely stating an asking 
· price, rather than as a special contract calling for a pur-
ehaser willing to pay a net minimum price, was supported by 
evidence that the owner refused to pay the commiaaion on 
the sole ground that he, and not the broker, was the proeur-
ing cause of the sale: that in a telephone conversation and in 
Broker's right to commission where owner sells property to 
"11lS1rouler of broker at less than stipulated price, notes, 43 A..L.lL 
; 128 A.L.B. 430. See, also, 4 Cal.Jur. 606; 8 Am.Jur. 1100 . 
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other communications with the broker prior to the sale, the 
owner stressed the commission percentage rather than the 
net figure; and that the only purchaser then in sight was one 
who was willing to pay only $35,000. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Alameda County. A. J. Woolsey, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for a broker's commission. Judgment for plain. 
tiff affirmed. 
Nathan Frankel, Sloss & Turner, Sloss & Eliot and 
Frank H. Sloss for Appellant. 
Fitzllerald, Abbott &; Beardsley and Franklin C. Stark 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, a re& estate broker, brought 
this action to recover a commission for the sale of defendant's 
real property. Defendant sold the property to a buyer pro-
cured by plaintiff at a price lower than the figure at which 
plaintiff was authorized to sell. The trial court entered 
judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. 
The question presented on this apepal is whether the 
agreement between the parties was a general contract merely 
stating an asking price or a special contract calling for a 
purchaser willing to pay a net minimum price. 
In April, 1943, plaintiff wrote to defendant to procure an 
agency to sell defendant's property. Defendant had pre-
viously attempted to sell this property personally and 
through· brokers for a period of about four years. He re-
plied to plaintiff's request by letter, dated April 29, 1943. 
The significant passages of the letter are: 
"1 acknowledge receipt of your letter under date of April 
27 with reference to my property at 645 Watkins Street 
in Hayward. Yes, I am interested in selling my property 
in Hayward providing that 1 can get my price. I have had 
quite a few inquiries as of late; however, I have not tied 
up with anyone exclusively at this writing. 
"The property, as you know, is one of the finest in 
Hayward. [Here follows an exhaustive description of the 
property.] 
"The only reason that I would care to sell it is because I 
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~. ment that I would like to do. If it wasn't for this, I wouldn't 
consider selling it at any price. I have a price of $40,000.00 
on the property and if you should arrange the sale, I will 
pay you 5% commission or a net to me of $38,000.00. [Here 
follow details on taxes and frontage.] 
: "If there is further information that you require, I would 
be gl&d to furnish it to you. I am not overly anxious to seU 
the property, but, however, as above stated, I would con· 
sider a sale." 
.' Upon receipt of this letter, plaintitf immediately reported 
to defendant that he had discussed the property with a client. 
The broker informed defendant that "I did not discuss price 
. the telephone, but I do think there should be only one 
on the property, regardless of whether you sell it or we, 
price being $40,000.00." 
Pl .. ;, .. ~;ifl' made an active effort to sell defendant's property 
"~, ... -.- and after May, 1943. His prospective purchasers 
.~elLudEId one Elwood Johnson, the ultimate buyer. Johnson 
a partner in an implement business and a competitor of 
; tenants then occupying defendant's premises. He gave 
broker little encouragement until September, 1943, when 
company received a notice from its landlord terminating 
tenancy. At this time Johnson requested additional 
~.~[o1'Jnation concerning defendant's property, and plainti1f 
i.OOlIlQlllcteQ him through the building and grounds. He in-
.,~Ded Johnson that a local bank was familiar with the 
tJU'1DP8rty, and together they had a conference with the 
:balnkell". who aftlrmedplaintirs views concerning the value 
'iJ?ltain.titf nut showed Johnson defendant's letter of April 
which stated defendant's terms and price. Johnson 
willing to pay $40,000 and mentioned $35,000 as his 
Johnson was considering other means of solving 
··problem at this time, but plainti1f advised the purchase 
flefendant's property and raised persuasive objections to 
;JOJmsc)n's proposed alternatives. On October 4, 1943, John-
arrangements for a direct meeting in Sacramento 
. defendant. He revealed his plans to plainti1f, who re-
!I1I8!1ted that defendant be informed of plainti1f's part in in-
[ __ iDJr Johnson in the property. Plainti1f made certain 
QeIena18.nt;'s knowing of his ,efforts by telephoning him. 
"" •• ,&4 ..... is a con1lict in the testimony regarding the statements 
during this telephone conversation. According to plain-
/ 
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tiff, he told defendant that he felt he had sold Johnson the 
property and that Johnson was going to Sacramento to make 
the purchase. He testified that defendant assured him of the 
5 per cent commission if Johnson bought the property. 
According to defendant's testimony. however. plaintiff 
stated that he was unable to sell the property to John.o;on 
and hoped that defendant could close the sale with him. 
Plaintiff then asked if defendant would give him "something 
for what efforts" he had put forth. 
On October 5, 1943. Johnson and defendant met in Sac-
ramento. They discussed the merits of the property, and de-
fendant stated his price to be $40,000. Johnson !eplied that 
the property was worth only $35,000 to him. Defendant of-
fered the property for $38,000 and, when Johnson stood firm, 
suggested that they split the difference and close the deal 
at $36,500, subject to the approval of his wife. John-
son refused to commit himself on that figure, and the parties 
agreed to resume negotiations the following week. 
On October 8, 1943, three days after the Sacramento meet-
ing, defendant sent a telegram to the broker terminating his 
agency: ". . . my property . . . not for sale at this time 
through any broker. Have decided to sell direct therefore no 
commission to anyone." Shortly thereafter. defendant was 
persuaded to give another broker a 10-day exclusive agency 
to sell the property. Defendant meanwhile promised Johnson 
that a definite answer on the $35,000 offer would be forth-
coming in two weeks. The exclusive agency was not fruitful 
and early in November Johnson purchased defendant's prop-
erty for $35,000. Plaintiff demanded a commission, but de-
fendant refused to pay it. This action ensued, and the trial 
court, sitting without a jury, found that the contract was a 
general contract and that plaintiff had procured a purchaser 
ready, willing, and able to pay the sale price of $35,000. Plain-
tiff was therefore adjudged entitled to a 5 per cent commis-
sion on the sale. 
Defendant appealed from thl) judgment on the ground that 
as a matter of law the agreement between the parties was a 
net contract, calling for a commission to plaintiff only if the 
sale price exceeded the net figure of $38,000. Plaintiff, on the 
other hand, takes the position that the agreement constituted 
a general contract entitling him to a 5 per cent commission 
on the sale price. Plaintiff also contends that even if the agree-
ment was a net contraet, he is entitled to his commission be-
' ... Aug.1947] P ALMTAU 1J. DANIELSON 
[31) C.2d 517: 18.1 P.2d 265] 
521 
. 'CaUse defendant terminated the agency and sold the prop-
erty at a lower figure in bad faith. Since we construe the 
agreement to be a general contract, it is unnecessary to con-
sider plaintiff's contention regarding bad faith . 
. [1] Ordinarily, the price at which a broker is authorized 
sell property is considered merely an asking price to guide 
broker in his negotiations with prospective purchasers. 
Rest. Agency, § 447, Comment b.) If the broker procures 
DU1'C1ILlLIiI::r willing to pay a lower price, the owner cannot 
.HII ..... ,.;..",. the broker of his commission by conducting the final 
!JJU~tia1~ioIlS himself and selling at a lower figure to the pur-
;" .... ,.aA? procured by the broker. (See 128 A.L.R. 430; 43 
1103.) 
An owner is entitled, however, to make a special con-
With the broker whereby the latter is required to pro-
a purchaser willing to pay a particular price or meet 
~.eei1IC conditions imposed by the owner. In such eases, if 
sells the property to a purchaser procured by the 
,~I'!;IJU:.(', but on different terms from those stated in the con-
broker is not entitled to a commission in the absence 
faith. (Backman v. Guadalupe R. Co., 78 Cal.App. 347, 
[248 P. 296].) [3] In brokers' net contracts. a fixed 
amount must be paid to the owner and the broker's com-
»8tlS&t:ion is limited to the excess of the payment by the pur-
over the net amount specified. (Haigler v. Donnelly, 
674. 678 [117 P.2d 331].) 
the instant ease defendant does not contend that plain-
. was required to furnish a buyer willing to pay $40,000, 
'priee stated in the contract, before he would be entitled 
QOmmission. Nor does defendant regard this agreement as 
contract that would entitle plaintiff to keep all in excesA 
Instead, defendant conceives the agreement to be 
.. net contract in which defendant must be assured 
t,38;llOO net to him, but the broker is entitled only to a 5 
ioIH>' .... ,.,~ commission if the property is sold for $40,00 or more. 
The contract, authough ambiguous, does not reason-
itself to defendant's construction. Defendant stated : 
a price of $40,000.00 on the property and if you 
arrange the sale, 1 will pay you 5% commission or a 
me of $38,000.00." If the phrase beginning "or a net 
••. " is excluded, the letter clearly states nothing 
than an asking price for the guidance of the broker. 






of the amount that defendant would receive if the broker 
sold the property at $40.000. The $38,000 figure has no 
apparent independent significance, but is merely the amount 
remaining after the commission is subtracted from the pro-
posed sale price. Interpreted in this manner, the phrase may 
be explained without doing violence to the remaining lan-
guage in the contract. 
If the contract were construed to require $38,000 net to 
defendant. the provision for a 5 per cent commission would 
have little meaning. In such a case, a sale price of between 
$38.000 and $40.000 would result in less than a 5 per cent 
commission to the broker. The requirement of a $38,000 net 
minimum would also subordinate the proposed sale price of 
$40,000. The $40,000 would no longer be the proposed sale 
price, but would be transformed into a pivotal amount deter-
mining whether the broker should receive a 5 per cent ! 
commission or less. 
Defendant could have achieved the result he now seeks by 
using clear language in the letter of April 29th. He failed 
to do so and now attempts to construct a complicated schedule 
of commissions purportedly based upon an agreement ca-
pable of a more direct and reasonable construction. (Oiv. 
Oode, § 1654.) 
Moreover, the trial court's interpretation of the contract 
is supported by the evidence. (See Estate of Rule, 25 Oal. 
2d 1, 11 [152 P.2d 1003. 155 A.L.R. 1319}.) There w&." 
evidence from which the trial judge could infer that it was 
not the meaning of the contract that a price of $38,000 net 
to the owner was a condition precedent to the payment of 
plaintiff's commission. 
Before the commencement of this action defendant con-
sistently took the position that plaintiff had not procured 
a purchaser for the property. He regards himself and persons 
in Johnson's home oftlce in San Francisco as the ones who 
actually procured Johnson as the purchaser. Defendant in-
troduced evidence at the trial to establish this point but the 
trial court found that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the 
sale. At no time, however. did defendant inform plaintifr 
that he would be denied a commission for any reason other 
than that he had not been able to sell the property. 
Defendant's telephone conversation with plaintifr before 
Johnson went to Sacramento and his subsequent communica-
tions with plaintiff are devoid of any reference to the so-called 
) 
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net price. According to plaintiff, defendant. stated over the 
telephone that "if Mr. Danielson [defendant] sold the prop-
erty to Mr. Johnson ... he would pay me a five per cent com-
mission. ,. Defendant contends that even if he is assumed to 
have made that statement, it is nevertheless consistent with his 
present position, since he thought that Johnson was willing 
. to pay the asking price of $40,000. Plaintiff's account of this 
conversation, accepted by the trial court, as stre.'lRinlZ the 
.. commission percentage rather than the net figure gains 
strength, however. in the light of defendant's subsequent 
· communications. 
· On October 8th, defendant sent the telegram to plaintiff 
· attempting to terminate the agency. There again no mention 
· was made of the purported net minimum. Defendant merely 
. in the telegram that the property was no longer for 
through any broker and that defendant had decided to 
· sell direct in order to avoid the payment of commissions. De-
fendant was not obligated to pay a commission, according 
'to his present theory, unless plaintiff procured a purchaser 
.. to pay more than $38,000. The evidence establishes 
that the only purchaser then in sight was Johnson, who was 
willing to pay only $35,000, and defendant was then nego-
1:'iA.t.in,D with him for the sale of the property. If defendant 
the agency because plaintiff had failed to pro-
a purchaser willing to pay the net minimum figure, 
could easily have so stated. 
learning of the sale, plaintiff wrote to defendant 
~uest:1IUl his 5 per cent commission. Defendant replied by 
.letUn- and quoted his telegram of October 8th. adding: "The 
~,,,,,..,.n"'1"N7 was listed at various times with several real estate 
Jlrc)kei~~e firms, none of whom were able to move the prop-
• Therefore. no commission to anyone." Thus. even after 
sale had been completed at a price lower than the now 
lIfillMfll·t..,wt net figure. defendant was contending that he, not 
was the procuring cause of the sale and for that 
ref'ns~~ to pay the commission. Had defendant con-
1i~~pIated that the contract called for $38.000 net to him, it 
IIJll~lOnablle to believe that he would have added that as a 
R:IIn.un.d for refusing to pay the commission. 
trial court could therefore reasonably conclude that 
"'og.I''''''''''''Ul~'S actions were incoJl.'1istent with his contention that 
understood the contract to mean that plaintiff was obligated 
procure a purchaser willing to pay a minimum net sum. 
judgment is a.ffirmed. 
